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Abstract 
The present research investigated a multilevel person-context interactionist framework 
for the relationship between right-wing ideologies and prejudice across two large, 
representative samples (Study 1: European Social Survey: N = 56,752; Study 2: World Values 
Survey: N = 74,042). Across three different operationalizations of right-wing ideology, two 
contextual levels (regional and national) of right-wing climate, and three types of outgroup 
attitudes (i.e., age-, ethnicity-, and gender-based), the analyses consistently revealed cross-
level interactions, showing a strong association between right-wing attitudes and negative 
outgroup attitudes at the individual level in contexts with a low right-wing climate, whereas 
this relationship is weaker and often even absent in contexts with a high right-wing climate. 
These cross-level interactions remained significant after controlling for statistical artefacts 
(i.e., restriction of range and outliers). The authors propose norm setting as the mobilizing 
mechanism through which a right-wing climate develops and curbs the influence of individual 
right-wing social-ideological attitudes on outgroup attitudes. 
  
3 
 
The mobilizing effect of right-wing ideological climates:  
Cross-level interaction effects on different types of outgroup attitudes 
Research on negative outgroup attitudes and its determinants has been on the forefront 
of scientific research in social psychology since the 1950s (e.g., Allport, 1954). Several 
personality traits and social-ideological attitudes have been proposed as important bases of 
how people think and feel about outgroups, such as authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), tough-mindedness (Eysenck, 1954), power distance 
(Hofstede, 1980), and conservation (Schwartz et al., 2001) (for an overview, see Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2010). Contemporary psychological research has proposed two broad social-
ideological attitudes that influence outgroup attitudes in different ways (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010). These dimensions of generalized social beliefs about the ideal arrangement of society 
(habitually referred to as “ideologies”) are often labeled social conservatism, right-wing 
authoritarianism or social-cultural right-wing attitudes on the one hand, and economic 
conservatism, social dominance orientation or economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes on 
the other hand (Duckitt, 2001; Middendorp, 1978).  
In the social-cultural domain, right-wing ideology reflects adherence to traditional 
rules, submission to authorities imposing discipline, and aversion to deviance (Altemeyer, 
1981). These social-cultural right-wing attitudes have been proposed to stem from 
motivational goals related to collective security, social order, social cohesion and conformity 
(Duckitt, 2001). In the economic-hierarchical domain, right-wing ideology entails the 
preference for intergroup dominance, social hierarchy and societal inequality (Middendorp, 
1978; see also Onraet, Van Hiel & Cornelis, 2013; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994), which is based on motivational concerns related to control over economic resources, 
superiority and power (Duckitt, 2001). 
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Much research relates both social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing 
attitudes to various types of negative outgroup attitudes and prejudice, including racism (e.g. 
Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005), sexism (e.g., Roets, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2012), and 
homophobia (e.g., Poteat & Spanierman, 2010). Moreover, individuals holding right-wing 
attitudes, especially at the economic-hierarchical level, show greater anti-elderly sentiment 
(Aosved, Long, & Voller, 2009; North & Fiske, 2013), suggesting that they see older people 
as weak and inferior. The relationship between the social-cultural dimension of right-wing 
attitudes and ageism is less straightforward, with the few available studies revealing small 
positive (e.g., North & Fiske, 2013) or negative associations (Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). In 
this regard, one may suspect that simultaneous views of the elderly as respected and relatively 
conventional on the one hand, but also as disadvantaged and resource-draining on the other 
hand, elicit ambiguous reactions in people holding social-cultural right-wing attitudes. 
In sum, the positive relationship between right-wing attitudes and outgroup prejudice 
is well-documented for a variety of different outgroups (with the socio-cultural aspect playing 
a somewhat ambiguous role for older-age outgroups). Moreover, these relationships were 
found with longitudinal designs (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010) and across different 
countries (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010).  
The Multilevel Character of Ideologies 
Although social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes are 
conceptualized as individual differences, these constructs are embedded within a much 
broader context of intergroup relations (Pratto et al., 1994). Indeed, an important feature of 
ideologies is that they are socially shared. Individuals are embedded in societal contexts, and 
ideological climates can provide social groups, organizations, and even whole societies with a 
set of unifying, collectively shared norms and values, which guide how individuals within 
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these contexts think about, understand, and evaluate other social groups (Cohrs, 2012). This 
“higher-level” character of ideology offers the opportunity to explore the role of ideological 
climates in shaping intergroup attitudes. Stangor and Jost (1997) have asserted that, in the 
intergroup relations literature, higher-level processes are far too often approached only 
theoretically, and little empirical research has been conducted to explore their normative 
influence in social phenomena. It is therefore unclear to what extent higher-order contextual 
variables like ideological climate have an impact beyond the values and beliefs individuals 
personally endorse on target variables like outgroup attitudes.  
Some studies have made use of the presence of radical right-wing parties as an 
indicator of a conservative climate within a geo-political area, showing that across European 
countries, the presence of such parties is related to negative attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration over and above the variance explained by individuals’ own political orientation 
(Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodeisky, 2006). Additionally, two studies conducted in 
Switzerland revealed that individuals’ opposition to anti-racism laws (Sarrasin et al., 2012) 
and individuals’ attitudes towards Muslim women wearing a veil (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 
2013) were predicted by the conservative climate of their municipality (indexed by the results 
on an earlier referendum), in addition to individual-level conservative values.  
However, the presence of particular political parties or referendum results can only 
serve as a proxy for right-wing ideological climates within a region, and they also do not 
capture the distinction between the social-cultural and economic-hierarchical dimensions as 
studied in the literature about right-wing attitudes at the individual level. Fischer (2009) 
therefore suggested a bottom-up approach to ideological climate by using aggregated 
individual-level measures of values and beliefs to reflect popular views within a context. The 
combined effects of the individual and contextual levels have been investigated in several 
studies studying peer groups. For example, Poteat, Espelage, and Green (2007) found that a 
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hierarchy-enhancing social climate within a peer group of friends was related to more 
negative attitudes among students towards homosexuals. Furthermore, Poteat and Spanierman 
(2010) reported that aggregated right-wing beliefs of peer groups predicted individuals’ racist 
and homophobic attitudes beyond their personal ideological views. 
The theoretical rationale here is that such peer group environments are social contexts 
in which group norms are developed and enforced through socialization processes that 
encourage the acceptance of and support for traditional rules, social order and social 
inequality (Poteat et al., 2007; 2010). Kiesner, Maass, Cadinu and Vallese (2003) further 
suggested that the salience of such contextual norms leads to the internalization of these 
norms and the ideological justification for their expressions. In the same vein, theorizing on 
psychological geography holds that social norms have top-down effects on personality and 
ideology by shaping life experiences and opportunities (Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). 
The basic idea here is that the traditions and daily practices common to an area affect social 
norms, which in turn affect people’s attitudes and behaviors.  
This psychosocial environment could, in turn, reinforce the regional social norms and 
influence the ways in which people in that region think, feel, and behave, even if those 
tendencies are contrary to their natural dispositions (Rentfrow et al., 2008; see also Crandall 
& Eshleman, 2003). In sum, individuals may use their own ideological beliefs as well as those 
of their fellow citizens to justify their outgroup attitudes. Yet, at the societal level, no 
published studies to date have investigated such aggregated ideology scores as a measure of 
right-wing climate in order to investigate its incremental power in the prediction of prejudice. 
To a Person X Context Interaction Approach 
Based on the findings we discussed above, there seems to be substantial evidence that 
right-wing ideological attitudes and right-wing social climates both uniquely contribute to 
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individual differences in prejudice. However, for a more complete understanding of outgroup 
attitudes, the study of the cross-level interaction between individual and society seems vital, 
and aligns well with the recurrent calls in the field for a more “integrated” (Doise, 1986) or 
“contextual” (Pettigrew, 1991) social psychology. A most interesting perspective on how such 
interactions may take form is provided by the interactionism framework (Blumer, 1969), 
which proposes that strong normative influences may weaken and even “take over” the 
influence of personal characteristics on an individual’s attitudes and behavior. Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) argued that situational triggers may either galvanize those 
already concerned about a particular problem, or may mobilize citizens to become worried 
about a political problem, whether or not they were already predisposed to be concerned. 
From a “galvanizing” perspective, in low right-wing climates, almost all individuals 
(also those with high levels of right-wing attitudes) might be elicited to show less negative 
outgroup attitudes (because of liberal norm setting), whereas in high right-wing climates, only 
people high in right-wing attitudes would be prejudiced. An experimental study provided 
some preliminary support for the galvanizing perspective, showing that especially those with 
authoritarian predispositions tended to be activated by contextual cues of social threat 
(Stenner, 2005). Also, a cross-country study indicated that the effect size of authoritarianism 
on prejudice was higher in countries where inhabitants were more likely to believe that 
immigrants increase crime rates (i.e., an indicator of a conservative regional norm; Cohrs & 
Stelzl, 2010). 
A “mobilizing” perspective holds that in low right-wing climates, only people high in 
right-wing attitudes would be prejudiced, whereas in high right-wing climates, almost all 
individuals (also those with low levels of right-wing attitudes) might be elicited to show more 
negative outgroup attitudes (because of conservative norm setting). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, and Thompson (2009) demonstrated in a 
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series of experimental studies that threats to the system led liberal individuals to converge to 
attitudes very similar to those of conservatives. Likewise, national-level exclusionary policies 
increased opposition against immigration, especially among individuals with egalitarian 
values (Schwartz, 2007).  
Nonetheless, to our knowledge, no studies have explicitly operationalized right-wing 
climates as aggregated individual-level ideologies and examined the cross-level interaction 
between right-wing attitudes and climates. Furthermore, whereas some small-scale studies 
investigated race-based outgroups, no studies have yet been conducted for age-based and 
gender-based outgroups.  
The Present Study 
This study is the first to thoroughly examine whether right-wing ideological climates 
galvanize individuals high in right-wing attitudes towards more prejudice, or mobilize 
individuals low in right-wing attitudes towards more prejudice. To ensure the robustness of 
the results obtained with this multilevel interactionist approach, we investigated the 
moderating influence of ideological climate in samples at the regional (Study 1) as well as the 
national (Study 2) level. Moreover, we tested the model for various forms of outgroup 
attitudes (i.e., anti-elderly, anti-young and anti-immigrant attitudes in Study 1; and anti-
elderly, anti-immigrant and anti-women attitudes in Study 2) to investigate the 
generalizability of the obtained relationships as well as to identify possible target-specific 
effects at the individual and group level.  
Study 1 
Method 
Data 
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Study 1 analyzed data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 
2008, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The European Social Survey is an academically 
driven cross-national survey explicitly developed and vetted to maximize cross-cultural 
invariance (Davidov et al., 2015). Data were collected by face-to-face interviews and are 
representative for each country. Round 4 data were collected between September and 
December 2008 (ESS, 2008) among 56,752 individuals living in 29 European countries (see 
Online Appendix A). Within each country, NUTS (“Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales 
Statistiques”, or “Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics”) can be distinguished. These 
units delineate within-country regions according to socioeconomic, cultural and historical 
characteristics, as determined by Eurostat (2003). For example, within Sweden, three NUTS-1 
regions are distinguished (East Sweden, South Sweden, and North Sweden). Each of these 
regions in turn include two or three smaller NUTS-2 regions, such as Stockholm and East 
Middle Sweden within East Sweden, Småland and the islands, South Sweden, and West 
Sweden within South Sweden, and North Middle Sweden, Middle Norrland, and Upper 
Norrland within North Sweden. NUTS-regions were used as higher-level units for this study 
(see below). ESS classified most respondents at the NUTS-2 level, with the exception of 
respondents in Belgium, France, Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, who were 
grouped according to the larger-scale NUTS-1 level. The overall sample hence identified 218 
NUTS regions with a mean number of participants per region of 260)
1
. 
For the analyses on ageism, we assigned all respondents younger than 50 years to form 
the ‘young’ group (Syoung, N = 30,729), and investigated their attitudes towards older people 
                                                          
1
 We report the results using the original regional codes provided with the ESS data. However, 
when we reclassified the NUTS-2 codes into their overarching NUTS-1 codes and conducted all 
analyses using these superordinate regions (N = 101 NUTS-1 regions; mean number of respondents 
per region M = 556), the pattern of results was similar (i.e., all significant results remained 
significant). 
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(i.e., over 70 years). Participants over 50 years formed the ‘old’ group (Sold, N = 24,841) and 
data were analyzed with respect to their attitudes towards young people (i.e. under 30 years). 
Because the age of 50 is the midpoint between the target groups in the age-related 
questionnaire items (see below), we selected this cut-off point to delineate the young and the 
old group and investigate the effects on ageism. Importantly, analyses using different cut-off 
points (i.e., under 40 (N = 21,087) or under 30 (N = 11,649) for Syoung, versus over 60 (N = 
15,342) or over 70 (N = 7343) for Sold) yielded similar results. Given that the straightforward 
split of the total sample at age 50 makes use of the maximal amount of data, these results are 
reported. 
To test our multilevel framework for negative attitudes towards ethnic outgroups, we 
omitted all respondents who had no national citizenship, who had a place of birth outside the 
country of data collection, or who classified themselves as belonging to a minority ethnic 
group in their country, resulting in a ‘non-immigrant’ sample (Snon-immigrant) with N = 51,816.  
Measures 
  Background characteristics. Means and distributions of age, gender, income and 
education for each sample are provided in Appendix B
2
. 
Individual-level measures. The ESS survey assesses a wide variety of items but 
usually does not include full-length scales. Therefore, building on previous studies (e.g., 
Abrams, Russel, Vauclair, & Swift, 2011; Onraet et al., 2013), we selected relevant items and 
compiled the best possible measures for our constructs of interest. Because in some cases 
                                                          
2
 Running all analyses with or without statistical control for the demographic variables did not 
alter the findings. For clarity reasons, we therefore reported results from the analyses without inclusion 
of the demographic variables. The results from the analyses including demographics are available 
upon request with the first author. 
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rating scales differed across items, Principal Component Analyses
3
 (PCA) were conducted to 
compute a single component for every construct, with a mean and standard deviation of 0 and 
1, respectively. For all scales, PCA corroborated the one-dimensional nature of the construct. 
Explained variance and factor loading range for each measure in each sample are displayed in 
Appendix C. 
Social-cultural attitudes. The five items previously used by Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, 
and Wagner (2013) were used to operationalize the construct of social-cultural attitudes. 
These items were “Schools must teach children to obey authority”, “People who break the law 
should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days”, “If a man is suspected of 
planning a terrorist attack in [country], the police should have the power to keep him in prison 
until they are satisfied he was not involved”, “How much like you is this person? It is 
important to her or him that the government ensures her or his safety against all threats. She 
or he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens,” and “How much like you is this 
person? She or he believes that people should do what they’re told. She or He thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching”. Respondents answered the 
first three items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Totally agree”) to 5 (“Totally 
disagree”) and the last two items on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Very much like 
me”) to 6 (“Not like me at all”). 
Economic-hierarchical attitudes. For economic-hierarchical attitudes, we combined 
the two items previously used by Onraet et al. (2013): “The government should take measures 
to reduce differences in income levels”, and “For a society to be fair, differences in people’s 
standard of living should be small”. Respondents answered on a five-point Likert scale 
                                                          
3
 We chose PCA to obtain a measure capturing as much of the total variance in the items as 
possible. Measures based on alternative data reduction methods such as Exploratory Factor Analyses 
yielded virtually identical results. 
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ranging from 1 (“Totally agree”) to 5 (“Totally disagree”), with higher values indicating 
preference for economic and societal inequality.  
Left-right political orientation. To include an additional political rather than social-
ideological indicator of individual right-wing attitudes, we used the following item: “In 
politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”. 
Negative attitudes towards other age groups. Negative attitudes towards other age 
groups were measured with three items asking participants to describe how they feel with 
respect to other age groups (Abrams et al., 2011). The items were “Please tell me how 
important it is for you to be unprejudiced against people of other age groups”, “Please tell me 
how important it is for you to be seen as being unprejudiced against people of other age 
groups”, and “Overall, how negative or positive do you feel towards people of [age group]?”. 
In the ‘young’ sample, the target age group refers to people over 70, whereas in the ‘old’ 
sample, the target group concerns people in their 20s. Respondents answered on a ten-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all important/Extremely negative”) to 10 (“Extremely 
important/Extremely positive”). All items were reverse coded. 
Negative attitudes towards immigration. Six items measured attitudes towards 
immigration (Sides & Citrin, 2007). The first three items read: “To what extent do you think 
[country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to 
come and live here?”, “To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a 
different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?”, and “To what extent do you 
think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” Respondents 
answered on the following four-point Likert scale: 1 (“Allow many to come and live here”), 2 
(“Allow some”), 3 (“Allow a few”), and 4 (“Allow none”). The last three items tapped into 
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appraisals of the value of immigration: “Would you say it is generally bad or good for 
[country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”, “Would you say 
that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live 
here from other countries?”, and “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people 
coming to live here from other countries?”). Answers were given on a ten-point Likert scale 
with 1 corresponding to full agreement with the first (i.e., negative) opinion and 10 to full 
agreement with the second (i.e., positive) opinion. These three items were reverse coded. 
Climate measures. 
Social-cultural climate. Regional indicators of the social-cultural climate within a 
NUTS-region were obtained by calculating the mean of individual factor scores on social-
cultural attitudes of all respondents within a specific region. 
Economic-hierarchical climate. To measure the economic-hierarchical climate within 
a NUTS-region, we averaged individual factor scores on economic-hierarchical attitudes of all 
respondents within a region. 
Left-right political climate. The item on left-right political orientation was also 
averaged at the NUTS-level so that higher scores refer to a context where the overall political 
stance tends to be more right-wing. 
Data analytic procedure 
We used multilevel modeling (MLM) because respondents (individual level) were 
nested within regions (social context level). All analyses were performed using SPSS 
Software (version 22.0; IBM Corp, 2013). For each analysis, we used the following 
procedure: first, we estimated empty (intercept-only) models which provide insight in the 
variances at the individual and contextual level. We assessed the intraclass correlations (ICC) 
for all indicators to ensure that there was substantial between-level variance, justifying the use 
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of MLM. All ICCs were medium to large (0.09 for anti-elderly, 0.08 for anti-young, and 0.16 
for anti-immigrant attitudes, respectively). During the next phases, all predictors were added 
to the model (in blocks). At the individual level, we tested the associations of right-wing 
ideology with negative outgroup attitudes. Next, at the context level, we tested the effect of 
the right-wing climate. Specifically, we included the relationship between the mean level of 
right-wing attitudes within the regions and the prejudice indicators at the individual level, 
while controlling for individual differences in right-wing attitudes. Finally, we analyzed the 
slope variance, testing whether the relationship between right-wing attitudes and negative 
outgroup attitudes was significantly different across regions, and whether our indicators of 
right-wing climate explain (part of) the variance in the slopes.  
All independent variables were grand-mean centered around the overall average of the 
specific sample to control for their compositional effects at the contextual level (Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002). We used full-information maximum-likelihood estimates with robust standard 
errors. For none of our variables, the proportion of missing values was higher than 0.6%. We 
modelled a random coefficient model where the intercept and the slope coefficients vary 
across regions (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Specifically, we investigated three 
combinations relevant for the multilevel interactionist hypothesis. Our first combination (the 
‘Social-cultural Model’) explored the interaction between social-cultural attitudes and a 
social-cultural right-wing climate on various prejudice outcomes. The second combination 
(the ‘Economic-hierarchical Model’) examined the interaction between economic-hierarchical 
attitudes and an economic-hierarchical right-wing climate in the prediction of negative 
outgroup attitudes. The third combination (the ‘Left-right Model’) investigated the interaction 
between political left-right orientation and general left-right political climate on our 
outcomes. 
Results 
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Main Analyses 
In each subsample, we ran a multilevel hierarchical linear regression analysis to test 
whether the relationship between right-wing attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes was 
moderated by right-wing climate. For all analyses, the step-by-step addition of predictors 
improved the goodness-of-fit statistics of each multilevel model significantly (see Appendix 
D). Importantly, there was significant variance in the slopes for all models (i.e., Wald Z-
scores for slope variance were significant; see Appendix E). Correlations among all study 
variables can be found in Appendix F. Final model results are summarized in Table 1.  
Social-cultural model. The first model explored the cross-level interactions between 
social-cultural attitudes and social-cultural right-wing climate. At the individual level, right-
wing attitudes were significantly and positively related to all prejudice outcomes. At the 
social context level, right-wing climate was positively related to both age-related outgroup 
attitude measures (but not significantly to anti-immigrant attitudes), indicating that individual 
negative anti-elderly and anti-young attitudes tended to be higher in regions with a right-wing 
climate. Most importantly, significant interaction effects between individual attitudes and 
regional climate emerged (see Table 1, and Figure 1, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on 
negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards the young, and towards immigration, 
respectively). Multilevel simple slope analyses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) showed that the 
relationships between right-wing attitudes and prejudiced attitudes were overall rather weak 
and sometimes non-significant in regions with a high (i.e., 1SD above the mean) right-wing 
climate (bSyoung = 0.07, p < .001; bSold = 0.03, p = .16; bSnon-immigrant = 0.13, p < .001), whereas 
the slope lines in regions with a low (i.e., 1SD below the mean) right-wing climate showed a 
substantial incline (bSyoung = 0.19, p < .001; bSold = 0.19, p < .001; bSnon-immigrant = 0.27, p < 
.001).  
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Economic-hierarchical model. The second model considered the other dimension of 
right-wing ideology by investigating cross-level interactions between economic-hierarchical 
attitudes and an economic-hierarchical right-wing climate. At the individual level, significant 
and positive within-level effects of right-wing attitudes on all prejudice outcomes were found. 
At the social context level, significant and positive between-level effects emerged, indicating 
that negative outgroup attitudes tended to be higher in regions with a high right-wing climate. 
Furthermore, significant cross-level interaction effects were obtained (see Table 1, and Figure 
2, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards the 
young, and towards immigrants, respectively). Simple slope analyses indicated that the 
relationships between economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes were quite weak in regions 
with a high right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.03, p = .001; bSold = 0.03, p = .04; bSnon-immigrant = 
0.02, p = .06), while the slope lines showed a substantial incline in regions with a low right-
wing climate (bSyoung = 0.13, p < .001; bSold = 0.10, p < .001; bSnon-immigrant = 0.06, p < .001).  
Left-right model. This model used political orientation as an indicator of right-wing 
attitudes and right-wing climate. At the individual level, right-wing political orientation was 
only significantly and positively related to negative attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration. At the social context level, right-wing political climate was positively related to 
negative outgroup attitudes, but none of these effects were significant. Significant cross-level 
interaction effects were obtained (see Table 1, and Figure 3, Panel A-C for cross-level 
interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards the young, and towards 
immigrants, respectively). Multilevel simple slope analyses revealed that the relationships 
between right-wing orientation and negative outgroup attitudes were weak in regions with a 
high right-wing climate (bSyoung = -0.02, p = .06; bSold = -0.01, p = .64; bSnon-immigrant = 0.07, p < 
.001), where (except in the ‘old’ sample) the slope lines generally showed a moderate incline 
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in regions with a low right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.05, p < .001; bSold = 0.02, p = .31; bSnon-
immigrant = 0.14, p < .001). 
 
Additional Analyses 
The significant cross-level interactions we obtained could be due to the possibly 
smaller variance in right-wing ideological attitudes in high right-wing regions as opposed to 
low right-wing climate regions. We tested this restriction-of-range hypothesis in every sample 
by 1) exploring the correlation between the mean-level and the standard deviation of 
ideological attitudes of our 218 NUTS-regions, and 2) entering the standard deviation (SD) of 
the particular attitude in the first step of our multilevel regression analyses. Correlations 
between climate and mean SD ranged from r = -0.14 (p < .01) to r = 0.13 (p < .01), indicating 
that there is no overall restriction of variance in right-wing ideology in regions with a high 
right-wing climate. Moreover, the inclusion of SDs of ideology into our analyses did not alter 
the findings, and did not explain negative outgroup attitudes above the other predictors. 
Additional inclusion of cross-level interactions between individual ideology and contextual 
SD in ideological climate also did not alter the findings. 
Finally, we also tested for outlier effects. One outlier below 3SD for social-cultural 
right-wing climate was detected in all subsamples (i.e., Bremen, Germany). In the ‘young’ 
and ‘old’ sample, one outlier above 3SD for right-wing political climate emerged (i.e., 
Jerusalem, Israel in Syoung, and Podkarpackie, Poland in Sold). The final model results 
remained, however, unaltered when excluding these NUTS-regions from either the sample-
specific analysis or from all our analyses (i.e., across samples). Results from all additional 
analyses are available upon request with the first author. 
Study 2 
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Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend the results of Study 1 by investigating 1) an 
additional form of prejudice (i.e., sexist attitudes of men towards women) and 2) a broader 
contextual level (i.e., nations across the world instead of regions across Europe).  
Method 
Data 
This study used data from the sixth round of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2012, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The World Values Survey is a global network of social 
scientists studying social and political life. Like ESS, WVS has made substantial efforts to 
ensure the equivalence of comparative quantitative data (Welzel & Inglehart, 2015). Round 6 
data were collected in representative national samples between 2010 and 2014 among 74,042 
individuals across the world (N = 52 countries; see Appendix A; mean number of 
observations per country M = 1,424). The WVS-6 was used because it also provides unique 
cross-regional data on ageism (i.e., negative attitudes towards the elderly) in addition to data 
concerning two other types of prejudice, i.e., negative attitudes towards multiculturalism and 
towards women. To test our person-context interactions for these specific outcomes, we 
selected three subsamples. Specifically, similar to Study 1, all respondents younger than 50 
years formed the ‘young’ sample (Syoung, N = 49,370), and to compose the ‘non-immigrant’ 
sample (Snon-immigrant, N = 54,775), we dropped all respondents without national citizenship, 
with place of birth outside the country of data collection, or with at least one parent being 
immigrant. To run our analyses concerning negative attitudes towards women, we considered 
male respondents only (i.e., Smale, N = 35,032). 
Measures 
  Background characteristics. Means and distributions of age, gender, income and 
education for each sample are provided in Appendix B. 
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Individual-level measures. Similar to Study 1, we performed PCA to create a single 
measure for each specific construct. For all scales, PCA corroborated the one-dimensional 
nature of the construct. Explained variance and range of factor loadings for each measure in 
each sample are displayed in Appendix C. 
Social-cultural attitudes. We selected seven items previously used by Marien and 
Hooghe (2011) that closely relate to the construct of social-cultural attitudes, especially 
tapping into conservative, norm-driven moral orientations. Participants were asked the 
following: “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always 
be justified, never be justified, or something in between: homosexuality, prostitution, 
abortion, divorce, sex before marriage, suicide and euthanasia. Response scales ranged from 1 
(“Never justifiable”) to 10 (“Always justifiable”). All items were reverse coded before 
computing a factor score. 
Economic-hierarchical attitudes. We selected three items tapping into economic-
hierarchical attitudes. The first two items were based on Onraet and colleagues (2013). 
Respondents answered the question “How would you place your views on this scale?” on a 
ten-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 10 for two bipolar scales: “Incomes should be made 
more equal” (1) to “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” 
(10) and “Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
for” (1) to “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” (10). The third 
item was “The state should make people’s incomes equal”, which ranged from 1 (“Not an 
essential characteristic of democracy”) to 10 (“An essential characteristic of democracy”). 
The last item was reverse scored so that higher values indicate preference for economic and 
societal inequality. 
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Left-right political orientation. The same measure as in Study 1 was used, asking 
respondents to place themselves on a 10-point scale with lower values representing the left 
side of the political spectrum and higher values representing the right side. 
Negative attitudes towards the elderly. Negative attitudes towards the elderly were 
measured with four items: “Older people get more than their fair share from the government”, 
“Older people are a burden on society”, “Companies that employ young people perform better 
than those that employ people of different ages”, and “Old people have too much political 
influence”. Respondents answered on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly 
agree”) to 4 (“Strongly disagree”). All items were reverse coded. 
Negative attitudes towards multiculturalism. Negative attitudes towards 
multiculturalism were assessed by showing respondents a list of various social groups (see 
Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011) asking them which groups they would not like to have as 
neighbors. Three of these groups were relevant for our measure: people of a different race, 
immigrants/foreign workers, and people who speak a different language. The responses were 
recoded as 0 corresponding to “not mentioned” and 1 corresponding to “mentioned”. 
Negative attitudes towards women. Similar to Paxton & Kunovich (2003), sexist 
attitudes were measured by six items tapping into prejudice against women. The first two read 
“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”, and “If a woman 
earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems”. Respondents 
selected 1 (“Agree”), 2 (“Neither”), or 3 (“Disagree”). The other four items (“When a mother 
works for pay, the children suffer”, “On the whole, men make better political leaders than 
women do”, “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”, and “On the 
whole, men make better business executives than women do”) were answered on a four-point 
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Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly agree”) to 4 (“Strongly disagree”). All items were 
reverse coded. 
Climate measures. Similar to Study 1, individual scores on each indicator of right-
wing ideological attitudes within each country were averaged to form national indicators of 
the right-wing climate. Higher scores refer to a country where, on average, popular beliefs 
tend to be more right-wing. 
Results 
Main Analyses 
Analogous to Study 1, we used MLM because respondents were nested within 
countries. All ICCs were medium to large (0.15 for anti-elderly, 0.13 for anti-immigrant, and 
0.35 for anti-women attitudes, respectively), indicating that there was substantial between-
level variance. We modelled a random coefficient model in which the intercept and the slope 
coefficients were allowed to vary across countries. Again, we investigated the ‘Social-cultural 
Model’, the ‘Economic-hierarchical Model’ and the ‘Left-right Model’. For all analyses, the 
step-wise inclusion of predictors improved the goodness-of-fit statistics (see Appendix D) of 
each model significantly. Importantly, there was significant variance in the slopes for all 
models (i.e., Wald Z-scores for slope variance were significant; see Appendix E). Correlations 
among all study variables are shown in Appendix G. Final model results are summarized in 
Table 2.  
Social-cultural model. The first model examined the cross-level interactions between 
social-cultural attitudes and a social-cultural right-wing climate. At the individual level, right-
wing attitudes were positively related to all prejudice outcomes. At the contextual level, right-
wing climate was significantly positively related to negative outgroup attitudes towards 
immigrants and women (but not significantly to attitudes towards the elderly), indicating that 
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negative attitudes toward immigrants and women at the individual level tended to be higher in 
regions with a higher right-wing climate. Most importantly, significant interaction effects 
between individual right-wing attitudes and national climate emerged (see Table 2, and Figure 
4, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards 
multiculturalism, and towards women, respectively). Multilevel simple slope analyses showed 
weak and sometimes non-significant relationships between right-wing attitudes and negative 
outgroup attitudes in countries with a high (i.e., 1SD above the mean) right-wing climate 
(bSyoung = 0.04, p = .30; bSnon-immigrant = 0.03, p = .18; bSmale = 0.09, p < .001), whereas in 
countries with a low (i.e., 1SD below the mean) right-wing climate, the slope lines showed a 
substantial incline (bSyoung = 0.08, p < .001; bSnon-immigrant = 0.09, p < .001; bSmale = 0.14, p < 
.001). 
Economic-hierarchical model. Model 2 investigated cross-level interactions between 
economic-hierarchical attitudes and an economic-hierarchical right-wing climate. At the 
individual level, significant and positive within-level effects of right-wing attitudes on all 
prejudice outcomes were found. At the social context level, a significant, positive between-
level effect emerged in the ‘male’ sample. Sexist attitudes tended to be higher in regions with 
a higher right-wing climate. Furthermore, significant cross-level interaction effects were 
obtained (see Table 2, and Figure 5, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative 
attitudes towards the elderly, towards multiculturalism, and towards women, respectively). 
Simple slope analyses indicated weak relationships between right-wing attitudes and anti-
elderly and anti-women attitudes in countries with a high right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.03, p 
= .08; bSmale = 0.06, p = .007), while the slope lines showed a substantial incline in countries 
with a low right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.11, p < .001; bSmale = 0.10, p < .001).  
Left-right model. The third model targeted a political indicator of right-wing attitudes 
and right-wing climate. At the individual level, political orientation was significantly and 
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positively related to all outcomes. At the social context level, right-wing political climate was 
significantly and positively related to negative attitudes in the ‘non-immigrant’ and the ‘male’ 
sample. Moreover, a significant cross-level interaction effect was obtained predicting negative 
attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism, and marginally significant cross-level 
interactions were found for outgroup attitudes in the ‘young’ and the ‘male’ sample (see Table 
2, and Figure 6, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards the 
elderly, towards multiculturalism, and towards women, respectively). Multilevel simple slope 
analyses revealed weak and sometimes non-significant relationships between right-wing 
orientation and negative outgroup attitudes in countries with a high right-wing climate (bSyoung 
= 0.01, p = .12; bSnon-immigrant = 0.05, p = .009; bSmale = 0.11, p < .001), and they generally 
showed a moderate incline in countries with a low right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.03, p = .04; 
bSnon-immigrant = 0.11, p < .001; bSmale = 0.13, p < .001).  
Additional Analyses 
Similar to Study 1, we tested the restriction-of-range hypothesis by investigating the 
correlations between mean-level ideology and standard deviation (SD) in ideological attitudes 
of our 52 countries, and by entering the SD of the particular attitude in the first step of our 
multilevel regression analyses. Correlations between climate and mean SD ranged from r = -
0.13 (p < .01) to r = 0.15 (p < .01), indicating that there is no overall restriction of variance in 
right-wing ideology in regions with a high right-wing climate. Moreover, the inclusion of SD 
of ideology into our analyses did not alter the findings, and did not explain variance in 
negative outgroup attitudes above the other predictors. Additional inclusion of cross-level 
interactions between individual ideology and contextual SD in ideological climate also did not 
alter the findings. 
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Finally, we tested for outlier effects. One outlier below 3SD for social-cultural climate 
was detected in the ‘young’ sample (i.e., the Netherlands). In the ‘male’ sample, one outlier 
above 3SD for right-wing political climate emerged (i.e., Pakistan). Nevertheless, the final 
model results were unaffected when excluding these countries from either the sample-specific 
analysis or from all our analyses (i.e., across samples). Results from all additional analyses 
are available upon request with the first author. 
General Discussion 
Unique in its breadth and the magnitude of its samples, the present research provides a 
large-scale examination of individual and contextual bases of different forms of outgroup 
attitudes from a multilevel interactionist perspective. The aim was to apply this perspective on 
negative attitudes towards outgroups, and more specifically to investigate the additive and 
interactive contributions of right-wing ideological attitudes and climates herein. The studies 
tested the interactionism model for several variations of right-wing ideology (social-cultural, 
economic hierarchical, and left-right political orientation), for multiple forms of outgroup 
attitudes (i.e., based on age, ethnicity, and gender), and at two different contextual levels (i.e., 
regional and national), thereby allowing to establish generalizable patterns. 
In accordance with previous findings at the individual level (e.g., Asbrock et al., 
2010), an overall, positive relationship between right-wing ideology and negative outgroup 
attitudes emerged across target groups. This association was clearest for the social-cultural 
and economic-hierarchical dimensions of right-wing ideology (as compared to political 
orientation). At the contextual level, a right-wing climate within a region (Study 1) or a 
country (Study 2) was also related to more negative outgroup attitudes of its inhabitants 
towards the different target groups, over and above the influence of individual-level 
ideologies. Again, this effect was clearest for the social-cultural and economic-hierarchical 
dimensions of ideology.  
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Most importantly, we obtained several cross-level interactions indicating that the slope 
of the right-wing ideology - negative outgroup attitude relation is steeper in low right-wing 
contexts as compared to high right-wing contexts. In Study 1, the individual-level relationship 
between the two dimensions of right-wing attitudes (social-cultural and economic-
hierarchical) and the three types of outgroup attitudes was significantly weaker in European 
regions with a high rather than low social-cultural or economic-hierarchical right-wing 
climate. Moreover, these effects were largely replicated with an indicator of political 
orientation. Similarly, in Study 2, using country-level indicators of right-wing climate across 
the world, these person-context interactions on age-based and ethnicity-based outgroup 
attitudes were replicated. Additionally, we found a similar cross-level interaction on men’s 
negative attitudes towards women. Although the effects in Study 2 were somewhat smaller in 
size, these replication results yielded strong additional support for the interactionism 
perspective, not in the least because in Study 2 the number of available contextual units (i.e., 
52 countries) was considerably lower than in Study 1 (i.e., 218 NUTS-regions), and the 
influence of country-level climate is expected to be more diffuse than that of the more 
proximal, regional environment where people spend most of their time and have their day-to-
day interactions (Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014). Moreover, statistical control 
for demographic influences (i.e., age, gender, income, and education) and possible statistical 
artefacts (i.e., the presence of outliers and a restriction of range effect) did not alter the 
findings, further attesting to their robustness. 
Mobilizing Right-Wing Climates 
The conclusion across the different samples and forms of outgroup attitudes is 
straightforward: right-wing ideological climates moderate the relationship between right-wing 
ideologies and negative outgroup attitudes. A high right-wing climate appears to eclipse the 
influence of the individuals’ own social beliefs, causing individuals’ outgroup attitudes within 
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that context to converge towards higher levels, regardless of personal ideology. In contrast, in 
a low right-wing climate, the relationship between a person’s ideological attitudes and 
outgroup attitudes remains highly significant. These findings thus reveal an interesting 
asymmetry. In a high right-wing climate, people low in right-wing ideological attitudes are 
drawn to increased levels of negative outgroup attitudes by the contextual climate, whereas in 
a low right-wing climate people high on these ideological attitudes do not show a similar 
tendency to adapt their prejudice levels in the opposite direction.  
In other words, a right-wing context seems to have power to influence citizens of all 
ideologies when it comes to negative outgroup attitudes, whereas a more progressive context 
does not seem to have the same mobilizing impact on the general population. This observation 
is reminiscent of other studies in social psychology that have amply illustrated that “the 
monster of prejudice” is easily evoked in the individual’s mind. The classic Robber’s Cave 
studies of Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) attest to this issue. In these studies, 
twelve-year-old boys were divided into two groups that had to compete for valuable 
resources, which was shown to quickly lead to conflict and even intergroup violence. 
Restoring the peace between the two, however, proved to be much more difficult. Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) even showed that the mere presence of an outgroup is 
enough to elicit prejudice and discrimination, further attesting to the ease with which a 
negative orientation towards outgroups arises. In line with these classic studies, our results 
show that the presence of a “prejudice-friendly” climate within a society has the potential to 
elicit negative outgroup attitudes, even among people who do not have prejudice-prone 
ideological attitudes.  
Sniderman and colleagues (2004) advanced the mobilizing hypothesis to account for 
the potential of a right-wing context to increase prejudice “across-the-board” (p. 43); that is, 
among citizens all across the ideological spectrum. To understand the nature of this 
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mobilizing effect, we argue that norm setting plays a pivotal role. Social-cultural right-wing 
climates emphasize conformity and adherence to traditional norms, which may create the 
perception of greater collective ingroup identity and uniformity of shared norms and values 
(Cohrs, 2012), especially affecting those who do not already adhere to these norms 
themselves. The more widely shared and supported these social beliefs become, the more they 
fuel perceptions of outgroups as threatening and the less likely positive intergroup attitudes 
will develop (see Fischer, 2009). Likewise, norm setting in economic-hierarchical right-wing 
climates legitimizes inequality within the societal context, emphasizes widely-shared beliefs 
of ingroup dominance over outgroups, and hence increases the public support for outgroup 
intolerance and derogation. Embedding this idea within the Justification Suppression Model 
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), such shared norms might offer a justifying social context that 
affords an opportunity for the expression of prejudice, and, hence, prejudiced attitudes 
“bubble up past suppression” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, p. 421), even among those holding 
rather liberal economic-hierarchical ideologies.  
Building on the works of Sniderman and colleagues (2004) and Crandall and 
Eshleman (2003), we propose that “popular” negative representations of outgroups within 
right-wing climates justify the prevailing societal arrangement and, eventually, become so 
ingrained and embedded within day-to-day interactions that they also influence those low in 
right-wing attitudes to embrace exclusionary attitudes. Interestingly, when the social norms 
within a region support outgroup tolerance, only individuals low in right-wing attitudes tend 
to display tolerant outgroup attitudes. Our reasoning for the smaller (or even non-existent) 
mobilizing effect of low right-wing climates would be that liberal norms of not expressing 
prejudice do not affect right-wing individuals to the same degree. Instead, these individuals 
tend to stick to their personal cognitions, beliefs, and values that serve to justify prejudice. 
Generalized Cross-Level Patterns across Various Prejudices 
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Notably, the mobilizing effects of right-wing climates generalize across outgroups 
based on age, ethnicity, and gender. Specifically, the observation that individual differences, 
social contexts, and their interaction effects yield similar findings for three of the most 
common forms of negative outgroup attitudes attests to the functional equivalence of all these 
prejudices in the individual’s mind. This finding reminds us of studies that have shown that 
prejudice generalizes to different ethnic outgroups, and even to unknown groups or fictitious 
groups (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Moreover, prejudice towards ethnic outgroups also spreads 
over to other social groups, like women (Roets et al., 2012), physically or mentally impaired 
people (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006), gay people (Poteat & 
Spanierman, 2010), and individuals with another religion (Aosved et al., 2009). The present 
demonstration further extends the idea that the specific target group in itself is only of 
secondary importance, presenting the first evidence on the functional resemblance of negative 
outgroup attitudes even in cross-level patterns. 
Our results thus corroborate the idea of unity in various negative outgroup attitudes 
(Allport, 1954; Asbrock et al., 2010), which leads to some remarkable observations, 
especially with respect to age-based groups. Because social-cultural attitudes reflect 
conservative and traditional views, one could expect these attitudes to relate to respect for 
older people, given their potential status as the guardians of conventional, old-fashioned 
values and traditions. Hence, decreased levels of negative attitudes about the elderly may have 
been expected (see Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). However, both at the individual and social 
context level, right-wing attitudes were positively related to such negative attitudes. It is 
possible that young individuals adhering to right-wing ideological views consider the elderly 
as weak and resource-draining, rather than esteemed and honored. 
Moreover, the finding of individual, context, and interaction effects on negative 
attitudes about age groups in both directions (young versus old, and vice versa) is notable. 
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Outgroup borders are fluid for this social category and such attitudes can be considered to 
reflect prejudice towards one’s own future or past ingroup (Kogan, 1961; Lambert & 
Chasteen, 1997). It seems strange to exhibit negative attitudes towards a social category that 
one will belong to, or has belonged to oneself. However, other research has found evidence 
that people may even exhibit prejudice towards their current ingroup. For example, Roets and 
colleagues (2012) reported that women often show sexism against their own gender group, 
and argued that prejudice does not stem from group differences, but rather reflect individual 
differences in people’s perspective on the social world (in particular social-cultural and 
economic-hierarchical attitudes) that stem from their motivated cognitive style.  
Limitations, Implications and Directions for Future Research 
Our study holds some notable limitations which we discuss below. First, in our 
studies, we operationalized ideological climate as the aggregate of self-reported ideology of 
the inhabitants of a particular area. However, alternative approaches to operationalize 
ideological climate within a given region may be useful. For example, objective bottom-up 
measures such as (extreme) right-wing voting behavior (Sarrasin et al., 2012), or top-down 
measures such as integration policies at the regional or national level (Schlueter, Meuleman, 
& Davidov, 2013) could sort a similar mobilizing effect on individuals low in right-wing 
attitudes. 
Importantly, the combination of analyses at a more proximal, regional level within 
European countries in Study 1, and at a broader, national level across the world in Study 2, 
showed that the interactionism perspective applies at different scales, demonstrating both the 
specificity and generalizability of the effects. We acknowledge that the effect sizes in Study 2 
were more modest compared to Study 1, possibly due to the lower number (i.e., 52 countries) 
of context-level units. Note that the even lower number (i.e., 29 countries) of country-level 
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units in Study 1 precluded us from performing cross-level interaction analyses between 
individual-level and country-level ideology. Also, theoretically, norm setting is more likely to 
take place, and to have the most impact in a fine-grained context as opposed to large context 
units. Indeed, people spend most of their social time in (within-country) regions and even in 
cities and neighborhoods. A next step could be to use longitudinal designs in order to detect 
how climates can change over time, and how such evolutions may affect the individual’s 
outgroup attitudes. Future studies could also include climate-level measures of social norms to 
test our hypothesis that norm setting serves as the mobilizing mechanism through which a 
right-wing climate develops and curbs the influence of individual right-wing social-
ideological attitudes on outgroup attitudes. 
Finally, the present studies aimed to meet the recurrent calls for a more integrated and 
situated theorizing of intergroup dynamics (e.g., Doise, 1986). The finding that right-wing 
ideological climates instill exclusionary social norms that steer individuals to react more 
negatively and discriminatory towards outgroups, even when not personally endorsing right-
wing attitudes, is certainly most relevant to understand intergroup attitudes and conflict. In 
particular, it points out the danger of right-wing ideology among citizens reaching a critical 
mass so as to form a social norm which drags even people who do not endorse the ideology 
into outgroup derogation. The history of Europe and other regions has taught us how such 
process may spiral out of control and, in the worst of cases, may end in a society that allows 
for violent repression or even genocide of outgroups to happen.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Unstandardized Estimates (Standard Errors in Brackets) of Multilevel Regression Analyses 
on Outgroup Attitudes in Study 1 (European Social Survey data) 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Social-cultural Model    
Social-cultural attitudes (SCA) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.01) 
Social-cultural climate (SCC) 0.28*** (0.06) 0.24*** (0.05) 0.09 (0.06) 
SCA X SCC -0.16*** (0.03) -0.21*** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.03) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 3.81% / 7.95% 6.02% / 10.61% 9.67% / 3.91% 
Total Explained Variance
b 
4.17% 6.40% 6.18% 
Explained Slope Variance 22.17% 20.26% 29.14% 
Economic-hierarchal Model    
Economic-hierarchical attitudes (EHA) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
Economic-hierarchical climate (EHC) 0.26*** (0.06) 0.14* (0.06) 0.36*** (0.06) 
EHA X EHC -0.15*** (0.03) -0.11*** (0.03) -0.07** (0.02) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 2.33% / 6.34% 1.13% / 6.79% 1.16% / 19.33% 
Total Explained Variance
b
 2.69% 1.60% 4.03% 
Explained Slope Variance 17.41% 15.04% 6.80% 
Left-right Model    
Right-wing orientation (RWO) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 
Right-wing climate (RWC) 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.06) 0.15 (0.11) 
RWO X RWC -0.16*** (0.04) -0.10** (0.04) -0.16*** (0.05) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 0.98% / 1.39% 0.66% / 2.82% 3.29% / 1.29% 
Total Explained Variance
b
 1.02% 0.84% 2.97% 
Explained Slope Variance 22.84% 5.33% 6.65% 
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Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
b
: Total explained variance = explained variance level 1* (1-ICC) + explained variance level 
2*ICC. 
The outcomes are negative attitudes towards older people in the ‘young’ sample (left), towards 
younger people in the ‘old’ sample (middle), and towards immigration in the ‘non-immigrant’ 
sample (right). 
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Table 2  
Unstandardized Estimates (Standard Errors in Brackets) of Multilevel Regression Analyses 
on Outgroup Attitudes in Study 2 (World Values Survey data) 
 Syoung Snon-immigrant Smale 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Social-cultural Model    
Social-cultural attitudes (SCA) 0.06** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 
Social-cultural climate (SCC) 0.23 (0.09) 0.31* (0.12) 0.60*** (0.12) 
SCA X SCC -0.02* (0.01) -0.04** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 7.45% / 13.20% 13.94% / 14.83% 10.04% / 66.86% 
Total Explained Variance
b
 9.04% 14.02% 27.65% 
Explained Slope Variance 2.81% 3.63% 7.53% 
Economic-hierarchal Model    
Economic-hierarchical attitudes (EHA) 0.07** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.08** (0.03) 
Economic-hierarchical climate (EHC) 0.13 (0.09) 0.18 (0.13) 0.28* (0.07) 
EHA X EHC -0.06*** (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.08* (0.05) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 8.15% / 9.97% 12.63% / 0.38% 9.97% / 9.96% 
Total Explained Variance
b
 8.66% 11.57% 9.82% 
Explained Slope Variance 9.52% 0.22% 9.17% 
Left-right Model    
Right-wing orientation (RWO) 0.02* (0.01) 0.08* (0.02) 0.12*** (0.02) 
Right-wing climate (RWC) 0.22 (0.11) 0.17* (0.06) 0.47* (0.19) 
RWO X RWC -0.03
a
 (0.02) -0.05* (0.02) -0.02
a
 (0.01) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 0.92% / 12.29% 14.57% / 4.56% 10.40% / 19.44% 
Total Explained Variance
b
 4.07% 13.71% 13.20% 
Explained Slope Variance 3.37% 0.94% 2.27% 
Note: : 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
b
: Total explained variance = explained variance level 1* (1-ICC) + explained variance level 
2*ICC. 
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The outcomes are negative attitudes towards older people in the ‘young’ sample (left), towards 
multiculturalism in the ‘non-immigrant’ sample (middle), and towards women in the ‘male’ 
sample (right). 
 
